Security theatre versus terror TV
Bruce Schneier ( via Farnam Street ) makes the by-now-unoriginal observation * that: ...we pick a defense, and then the terrorists look at our defense and pick an attack designed to get around it. Our security measures only work if we happen to guess the plot correctly. If we get it wrong, we’ve wasted our money. This isn’t security; it’s security theater. Probably true. But then, terrorism isn't exactly "real" either: by design, it's a theatrical exercise too. Or perhaps a reality TV show. The clue is in the name - terrorism isn't designed to kill people, it's designed to make them scared . Thus, if we design this game for terrorists to play, they can win it just by smuggling a bomb through the security measures, regardless of whether it goes off. Notice that all the recently-discovered terrorist plots - the shoe bomber, the underpants bomber, the soft-drinks bomber, the printer-ink bomber - have failed? If the goal is simply to make us worry, make us r...