Knowing and Making

Bruce Schneier ( via Farnam Street ) makes the by-now-unoriginal observation * that: ...we pick a defense, and then the terrorists look at our defense and pick an attack designed to get around it. Our security measures only work if we happen to guess the plot correctly. If we get it wrong, we’ve wasted our money. This isn’t security; it’s security theater. Probably true. But then, terrorism isn't exactly "real" either: by design, it's a theatrical exercise too. Or perhaps a reality TV show. The clue is in the name - terrorism isn't designed to kill people, it's designed to make them scared . Thus, if we design this game for terrorists to play, they can win it just by smuggling a bomb through the security measures, regardless of whether it goes off. Notice that all the recently-discovered terrorist plots - the shoe bomber, the underpants bomber, the soft-drinks bomber, the printer-ink bomber - have failed? If the goal is simply to make us worry, make us r...

This article (from Jonah Lerner at Science Blogs, via Farnam Street ) looks quite important at first: A recent study led by Brian Knutson of Stanford, Drazen Prelec of MIT and George Loewenstein at Carnegie Mellon [ LC: a good start - I met Prelec at a seminar last year, very smart guy - and Loewenstein wrote my favourite behavioural economics book ] ...when subjects were shown pictures of an object they wanted...brain areas associated with anticipated rewards, such as the nucleus accumbens, exhibited a spike in activity... When the experimental subjects were exposed to the cost of the product, their insula and prefrontal cortex were activated. The insula secretes aversive feelings, and is triggered by things like nicotine withdrawal and pictures of people in pain. In general, we try to avoid anything that makes our insula excited. Apparently, this includes spending money... ...this data directly contradicts the rational models of microeconomics. Consumers... don't... perform an ...

Courtesy of Charlie Brooker and Farnam Street .